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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States has the largest and fastest growing drug market in the 
world, and the demand for generic drugs is steadily growing.1  The pharmaceutical 
industry is responsible for over three million American jobs, and pharmaceutical 
companies invest millions of dollars in promoting the research and development 
of new and generic drugs.2  In order to retain their competitive advantage, most 
pharmaceutical drug manufacturers seek patent protection.3  Manufacturers have 
learned to think creatively, using a variety of patents—including method, 
design—and research tool patents—in order to fully protect their lucrative 
inventions.  Congress encourages biomedical research and technological 
innovation through the patent system.4  Congress heavily regulates the 
pharmaceutical industry both directly through status such as the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetics Act5 and the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984 (the Hatch-Waxman Act),6 and indirectly through 
regulations promulgated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).7  Several 
volumes of the Code of Federal Regulations are specifically dedicated to 
describing what manufacturers must do in order to market a drug in the United 
States.8  
Due to recent congressional legislation and judicial decisions, however, 
generic drug manufacturers have lost some previously afforded patent 
protections,9 specifically with respect to their bioequivalency test method 
patents.  For example, the safe harbor provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
allows competing drug manufacturers to “borrow” information within the 
patents of their competitors so long as they agree to use the patents in 
furtherance of submitting information to the FDA.10  Competing generic drug 
manufacturers, for example, can take bioequivalency tests disclosed in the 
                                                                                                                   
 1 The U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, SELECTUSA.GOV, http://selectusa.commerce.gov/industry-s 
napshots/pharmaceutical-and-biotech-industries-united-states (last visited Oct. 14, 2014). 
 2 Id.  
 3 Getting Generic Drugs Q & A, FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/artic 
les/0063-generic-drugs-and-low-cost-prescriptions (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). 
 4 JOSEPH MILLER & LYDIA LOREN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
118 (Ver. 3.1 2013).  
 5 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).  
 6 Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). 
 7 21 C.F.R. § 1 (2013). 
 8 Id.  
 9 See, e.g., Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012); 
Teva Pharm., USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99121 (S.D.N.Y.). 
 10 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2013).  
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applications of their competitors and use the tests to manufacturer their own 
generic drugs.  A bioequivalency test is a method of testing a generic drug that 
proves that it is equivalent to a name brand drug that has already received FDA 
approval.  All generic drug applications must demonstrate bioequivalency, thus 
the tests are extremely valuable.  Unfortunately, bioequivalency testing methods 
can be very costly and time consuming to develop, so generic manufacturers 
patent the tests in an effort to protect them from use by competitors.  The safe 
harbor provision has thus thwarted the protection scheme on which generic 
manufacturers depended. 
The Federal Circuit recently expanded the scope of the safe harbor 
provision in 2012 in Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.11  A majority of the Federal Circuit in Momenta held that via the safe harbor 
provision, competing generic pharmaceutical manufacturers could use each 
other’s patented bioequivalency testing methods for pre-clinical research and 
manufacturing without incurring infringement liability.12  In 2003, Amphastar 
became the first generic manufacturer to submit an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) to the FDA to market Enoxaparin, a generic version of 
the name brand drug Lovenox, which is used to prevent blood clots.13  As a 
result of submitting the ANDA, Aventis, the manufacturer of Lovenox, sued 
Amphastar; after several years of expensive patent litigation, the FDA granted 
Amphastar’s ANDA, allowing it to manufacture enoxaparin.14  In the 
meantime, however, before the FDA granted Amphastar’s ANDA for 
enoxaparin, Momenta “borrowed” Amphastar’s bioequivalency test, which was 
publicly disclosed in Amphastar’s ANDA and used the test to beat Amphastar 
to the market by more than a year.15  This one year boost resulting from 
“borrowing” Amphastar’s patent for bioequivalency allowed Momenta a 
monopoly on the generic market, resulting in profits of over $260 million per 
quarter.16 
This Note argues that the Federal Circuit’s holding in Momenta threatens 
manufacturers with a devastating loss of previously available patent protection 
for measuring the bioequivalency of generic drugs.  The Note concludes that 
trade secret law is the best alternative to patent protection until Congress 
decides to narrow the scope of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s safe harbor provision.  
Due to the high cost of submitting a New Drug Application or an ANDA to 
                                                                                                                   
 11 Momenta Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
 12 Id. at 1361.  
 13 Id. at 1351.  
 14 Id. 
 15 Id.   
 16 Id. 
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the FDA, generic drug manufacturers want to seek protection for their 
bioequivalency tests so that consumers can reap the benefits of competition.  In 
other words, giving generic manufacturers the ability to protect their 
bioequivalency tests would incentivize the production of generic drugs, which 
would in turn benefit consumers.  However, in light of Momenta, this protection 
is no longer available through patent law.17  Additionally, the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of Hatch-Waxman’s safe harbor provision has frustrated the 
generic drug manufacturer’s ability to protect its research and development 
investments.  Fortunately, a solution exists for generic drug manufacturers who 
wish to shield their tests and methods for bioequivalency from the hungry eyes 
of their competitors.  Despite the numerous regulations governing disclosure of 
information submitted to the FDA, including most notably the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), generic drug manufacturers, using a heightened 
degree of care, can protect bioequivalency tests as trade secrets. 
Part II of this Note first describes the FDA’s method of regulating generic 
drugs, including the process of submitting an ANDA, to demonstrate why this 
process is important to the patent protection which Momenta has recently 
frustrated for manufacturers.  This section then explains how some of the 
information submitted to the FDA in furtherance of the ANDA can be 
protected through trade secret law instead of through patent law. 
Part II next reviews the relevant parts of the Hatch-Waxman Act and 
specifically focuses on the evolution of the safe harbor provision, codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).  Moreover, this Part explores prior United States Supreme 
Court opinions leading up to Momenta which have interpreted the safe harbor 
provision and demonstrates that the scope of the safe harbor provision has 
been expanded to such an extent that protection via method patents for 
bioequivalency tests is no longer available.  
Additionally, Part II summarizes the current state of trade secret law and 
demonstrates how a bioequivalency test could qualify as a trade secret.  This 
part also discusses the four potential threats of disclosure that a bioequivalency 
test trade secret could face, including FOIA requests, FDA use, and litigation; 
related threats, including the common law right of public access and discovery 
requests.  
Part III argues that trade secret law is not only available to generic 
manufacturers but is ultimately a better alternative to protecting bioequivalency 
tests than patent law.  Part III demonstrates how generic manufacturers can 
overcome threats of disclosure of their trade secrets presentation FOIA 
requests, FDA use and disclosure, and litigation. 
                                                                                                                   
 17 Id. at 1362. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  FDA SUBMISSION REQUIREMENTS FOR GENERIC DRUGS 
Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act of 1938, Congress delegated to 
the FDA the power to enact specific regulations concerning requirements for 
marketing new and generic drugs.18  A new drug or generic bioequivalent may 
not be placed on the market without prior FDA approval.19  The process for 
gaining FDA approval is quite extensive, so this Note only discusses the most 
relevant and important requirements relating to generic drugs. 
First, in order to gain FDA approval to manufacture a generic drug, the 
manufacturer must submit an ANDA.  The application must be within one of 
the FDA’s delineated categories of acceptable drug products.20  ANDAs may be 
submitted for “[d]rug products that are bioequivalent, or the same as a listed 
[i.e. name brand] drug.  For determining the suitability of an [ANDA], the term 
‘same as’ means identical in active ingredient(s), dosage form, strength, route of 
administration, and conditions of use.”21  Within sixty days of receiving an 
ANDA, the FDA will conduct a preliminary review of the application to 
determine whether it may be filed.22  If the filing of an application is permitted, 
the party can submit it, and the FDA will then either send an approval of the 
application or deny it within 180 days of submission.23  
A central requirement for a successful ANDA is that the generic drug must 
be the bioequivalent of the listed (i.e., name brand) drug.24  A bioequivalency 
test is defined as “[i]nformation that shows that the drug product is 
bioequivalent to the reference listed drug upon which the applicant relies.”25  In 
other words, rather than submitting a New Drug Application, a manufacturer 
who wants to produce a generic version of an already existing drug proves in its 
ANDA that the generic is the same as the name brand drug; as a result, generic 
drug manufacturers are not required to demonstrate safety or efficacy of the 
drug in their ANDA, since these were already demonstrated in the application 
of the original manufacturer.26  Bioequivalency tests are thus of critical 
                                                                                                                   
 18 P.L. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).  
 19 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(a) (2013). 
 20 Id. § 314.92(a). 
 21 Id. § 314.92(a)(1).  For more on the requirements for the acceptable types of drug products, 
see id. §§ 314.92(a)(1), 314.122.  
 22 Id. § 314.101(a)(1). 
 23 Id. § 314.100(a).  
 24 Id. § 314.94(a)(7). 
 25 Id. § 314.94(7)(i). 
 26 See supra note 1.  
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importance to ANDAs, and even the analytical and statistical methods used in 
determining bioequivalency are subjected to FDA regulation.27  
In addition, a completed ANDA form must contain the following parts: a 
table of contents; a basis for submission (meaning the application must refer to 
a listed drug); the conditions under which the drug can be used; the drug’s 
active ingredients (which must be the same as the active ingredients in the listed 
drug); the route of administration, strength, and dosage form of the drug (which 
must be the same as those in the listed drug); bio-equivalence (discussed further 
below); the labeling and proposed labeling for the drug; the chemistry, 
manufacturing process, and controls of the drug; any drug samples requested by 
the FDA; any patent certifications used in the manufacture of the drug; and a 
statement of financial certification or disclosure.28  Additionally, “[a] complete 
study report must be submitted for the bioequivalence study upon which the 
applicant relies for approval.”29 As discussed in Part III, the FDA may freely 
use the information that it receives in an ANDA, and the FDA, like other 
Federal Agencies, has a broad disclosure policy, meaning that the FDA allows 
the public to obtain Agency information whenever appropriate.30  
Once a method for determining bioequivalency is established, generic drugs 
can be quickly and more easily produced because the drug manufacturers can 
demonstrate that the generic is the same as the listed drug, which has already 
extensively tested by the FDA.  Generic competitors thus have a great incentive 
to steal these bioequivalency testing methods in order to accelerate the process 
of submitting an ANDA.  Because the process of developing a bioequivalency 
test can be expensive and time consuming, generic drug manufacturers need 
assurance that the tests will receive some type of protection in order to 
incentivize their development.31  Given the breadth of information, time, and 
money required to submit an ANDA, generic manufacturers seek patent 
protection in order to make their investments worthwhile.  
                                                                                                                   
 27 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(7)(iii); see also id. §§ 56.104, 56.105 (providing exceptions to normal IRB 
requirements). 
 28 Id. §§ 314.94(a)(1)–(12). 
 29 Id. § 314.94(7)(i). 
 30 See infra text accompanying note 162 and discussion that follows. 
 31 See, e.g., Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(plaintiff patent holder sought enforcement of its method patent for a bioequivalency test); Teva 
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99121 (S.D.N.Y.) (involving a similar 
fact pattern). 
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B.  THE SCOPE OF THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT  
In order to demonstrate the breath of the problem that the Federal Circuit’s 
ruling in Momenta v. Amphastar has caused, this section discusses how the FDA’s 
regulations regarding generic drugs intersect with the Hatch-Waxman Act.  The 
relationship between the Hatch-Waxman Act and RDA regulations is critical 
for understanding why the Federal Circuit’s holding in Momenta frustrated the 
usefulness of patent protection for bioequivalency research and development.  
In order to fully understand the goals and problems of the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
it is first helpful to review the history which led to the statute’s enactment. 
Before the Hatch-Waxman Act became effective in September of 1984, 
there were no statutory provisions to protect pharmaceutical companies from a 
competitor’s allegations of patent infringement when they used another’s 
patented technology to perform pre-approval clinical research.32  Congress 
enacted the Act’s safe harbor provision “to establish that experimentation with 
a patented drug product, when the purpose is to prepare for commercial activity 
which will begin after a valid patent expires, is not a patent infringement.”33  
The Act specifically overruled the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Roche Prods. v. 
Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.34  Roche held that a competing drug manufacturer 
infringes by using a competitor’s patent for pre-clinical research because 
borrowing patented information for research purposes falls outside of the scope 
of the experimental use rule,35 which “ends with an actual reduction to 
practice.”36  The Federal Circuit declared, “[w]e cannot construe the 
experimental use rule so broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in the 
guise of scientific inquiry, when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not 
insubstantial commercial purposes.”37  This precedent left no protection to 
pharmaceutical companies alleged to infringe by competitors when they used 
another’s patented technology to perform FDA pre-approved clinical research. 
The safe harbor provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act,38 now clarifies: 
                                                                                                                   
 32 Roche Prods. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 33 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45 (1984) (quoting Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar 
Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1362 (Rader, C.J., dissenting)).   
 34 Id. pt. 2, at 27.  
 35 Roche Prods., 733 F.2d at 863. The experimental use rule is “an experiment with a patented 
article for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement 
[and] is not an infringement of the rights of the patentee.” Id. at 862 (internal quotations omitted) 
(internal citations omitted).  
 36 Nordberg Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1252, 1285 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 37 Roche Prods., 733 F.2d at 863. 
 38 H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 27 (1984). 
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It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, 
or sell within the United States or import into the United States a 
patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a Federal law 
which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or 
veterinary biological products.39  
Since the passage of the statute, the Supreme Court has interpreted its meaning 
fairly expansively.40  This Note will next briefly summarize the Supreme Court’s 
interpretations of the safe harbor provision, leading to the Federal Circuit’s 
most recent expansion in Momenta.  
The controversy over the scope of the safe harbor provision began early in 
the statute’s history; the Supreme Court first interpreted the safe harbor 
provision only six years after it was enacted in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.41  
Eli Lilly concerned whether the safe harbor provision applied to patented 
medical devices in addition to prescription drugs.42  The Supreme Court 
broadened the application of the statute to not only to drug patents, but also to 
medical devices.43  In writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reached this 
expansive holding by citing the Act’s purpose according to the legislative history 
“to respond to two unintended distortions on the 17-year patent term produced 
by the requirement that certain products must receive premarket regulatory 
approval.”44  According to the majority, Congress designed the safe harbor 
provision to prevent the patentee from having an extended monopoly on the 
market simply by virtue of the amount of time it takes another company to 
produce a bioequivalent drug.45  The majority additionally argued that the 
statute “allows competitors, prior to the expiration of a patent, to engage in 
otherwise infringing activities necessary to obtain regulatory approval.”46  
                                                                                                                   
 39 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).  
 40 See 496 U.S. at 665 (finding no infringement under § 271(e)(1) in the case of a patented 
medical device); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005) (holding that 
the use of a patented compound was protected by § 271(e)(1) as long as it was reasonable to 
believe that the compound tested could be submitted to the FDA at some later time and the 
experiments for which the compound was used would produce information relevant to an 
application). 
 41 496 U.S. 661. 
 42 Id. at 663. 
 43 Id. at 665.  
 44 Id. at 669.   
 45 Id. at 672–73.  
 46 Id. at 671.  
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However, Justices Kennedy and White dissented, arguing the safe harbor 
provision should not apply to anything beyond obtaining market approval for a 
drug, and that the statute should not apply to “all” products regulated by the 
FDA.47  Justice Kennedy explained that the testing of medical devices should 
not be protected by the safe harbor because Congress could not have intended 
for such an extraordinary meaning of the specific language in the statute.48  
In 2005, the Supreme Court again interpreted the scope of the safe harbor 
provision in Merck KGaA v. Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd.49  Merck posed the 
question of whether a manufacturer could use patented inventions during 
preclinical research under the immunity of the safe harbor provision when the 
results were not actually submitted to the FDA.50  Justice Scalia delivered a 
short, and probably too informal, unanimous opinion, holding that the safe 
harbor provision’s exception to infringement: 
[N]ecessarily includes preclinical studies of patented compounds 
that are appropriate for submission to the FDA in the regulatory 
process.  There is simply no room in the statute for excluding 
certain information from the exemption on the basis of the phase 
of research in which it is developed or the particular submission 
in which it could be included.51  
Thus, the Merck Court again widened the scope of the safe harbor provision. 
Following suit, the Federal Circuit further expanded the safe harbor 
provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act in Momenta v. Amphastar.  The issue in 
Momenta was whether the defendant generic manufacturer lawfully used the 
plaintiff competitor’s patented test for bioequivalency to test its own form of 
the generic drug Enoxaparin.52  Defendant Amphastar argued that it did not 
infringe because it used the plaintiff’s patent to test their own version of the 
generic drug Enoxaparin and submitted these test results to the FDA, therefore 
falling within the scope of the safe harbor.53  The court agreed with the 
defendant that its use of momenta’s bioequivalency test for Enoxaparin was 
“solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information under a Federal law”; and thus was permissible under the safe 
                                                                                                                   
 47 Id. at 680 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 48 Id. 
 49 545 U.S. 193 (2005).  
 50 Id. at 195.  
 51 Id. at 202. 
 52 Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 53 Id. at 1352–53. 
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harbor provision.54  The majority relied primarily on the text of the statute to 
support its position, arguing specifically that the phrase ‘under a federal law’ 
“extend[ed] beyond just the ‘most barebones information’ required by the FDA, 
and instead encompass[ed] all ‘materials the FDA demands in the regulatory 
process.’ ”55  Chief Judge Rader, however, relied on congressional purpose to 
dictate a different result.56 
In a strong dissent, Chief Judge Rader argued that Amphastar’s actions 
exceeded the scope of the safe harbor provision because Amphastar used 
Momenta’s patent for more than the mere submission of information to the 
FDA.57  In his view, “Amphastar stepped in and took Momenta’s patented 
invention without permission and used it to manufacture each commercial 
batch [of Enoxaparin] it sells on the market.”58  Additionally, the fact that 
Amphastar could only compete with Momenta by using its patent strengthened 
Chief Judge Rader’s conclusion that the safe harbor provision should be more 
limited in scope.59  In reaching this conclusion, Chief Judge Rader relied on 
legislative history to support his argument that Congress did not intend to give 
manufacturers the right to use another’s patented process to place a competing 
drug on the market,60 and criticized the majority for totally ignoring it.61  The 
safe harbor provision, he noted, was a congressional compromise because of its 
limited scope in time, quantity, and type.62  The time period covered by the safe 
harbor was only for pre-market approval; in other words, after the FDA 
approves the drug, the safe harbor provision does not protect further marketing 
activities.63  In terms of the safe harbor provision’s limitations on quantity and 
type, Chief Judge Rader explained that the statute “only applies to 
experimentation—and therefore would have limited impact on the patentee’s 
exclusivity during the life of the patent.”64  In all, Chief Judge Rader concluded 
that the safe harbor provision did not protect Amphastar from its use of 
                                                                                                                   
 54 Id. at 1353 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)).  
 55 Id. at 1356 (quoting Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1683 
(2012)).  
 56 Id. at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting).  
 57 Id.  
 58 Id.  
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 1362–63 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45–46 (1984)). 
 61 Id. at 1366. 
 62 Id. at 1365 (citing Innovation and Patent Law Reform: Hearing on H.R. 3605 Before the Subcom. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 696 (1984) 
(letter from Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association)). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. at 1365–66 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 45–46 (1984)). 
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Momenta’s patented bioequivalency test because Amphastar continued to use 
the test after it gained FDA approval, thus destroying Momenta’s right to 
exclude.65  As he lamented, “This result will render worthless manufacturing 
test method patents.”66 
Chief Judge Rader reached this fear that test method patents would no 
longer offer protection to patent holders by considering the implications of the 
majority’s holding.67  He argued that the majority of the Supreme Court and the 
Federal Circuit have interpreted the safe harbor provision so broadly as to allow 
competitors to use patented testing methods not just for pre-clinical research 
but also for manufacturing.68  Patents exist to define the exclusion rights of 
their holders,69 but the exclusion rights in this scenario have been all but 
snatched away, presenting a problem for generic drug manufacturers who spend 
millions of dollars developing tests to determine bioequivalency, and then seek 
to protect these tests from the hungry eyes of their competitors.  
C.  A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PATENT PROTECTION 
In order to understand what generic manufacturers have lost by their 
inability to protect their bioequivalency tests via patent law, this section briefly 
reviews the protection that manufacturers would receive from patents absent 
the Momenta v. Amphastar holding.  Patent law’s origin rests in the United States 
Constitution,70 which has been codified to protect “any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof” that is invented or discovered.71  In order to receive 
patent protection for an invention falling within one of these eligible categories, 
one must disclose his or her invention to the Patent Trademark Office (PTO)72 
and meet the other statutory requirements of novelty and non-obviousness.73  
Patent law’s scheme of protection of information via this disclosure process 
could be seen as the opposite of trade secret protection, which attempts to 
retain the value of information by protecting it against public disclosure.74  
                                                                                                                   
 65 Id. at 1367. 
 66 Id. at 1362. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 1361.  See also Merck KGaA v. Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 1953 (2005).  
 69 Id.  
 70 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 71 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 72 MILLER & LOREN, supra note 4, at 117. 
 73 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103. 
 74 MILLER & LOREN, supra note 4, at 27. 
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Assuming that all the requirements for a valid patent are met,75 the patentee 
receives protection for his or her invention for a period of twenty years.76  
During this time, the patentee holds an exclusive right to use the patented 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.77  In the context of 
bioequivalency testing methods of pharmaceutical drugs testing, the applicable 
patent eligible category is “process.”  Therefore, this Note proceeds referring 
solely to “process” patents, also known as method patents.  
If a patentee discovers that another entity is performing its patented process, 
the patentee can sue this competitor for infringement.78  If a court finds that the 
competitor infringes, the patentee is entitled to monetary damages and/or an 
injunction.79  Overall, patent protection is bent towards protection for an 
invention via disclosure of that invention,80 unlike trade secret protection, 
discussed below, which affords protection for inventions by keeping them a 
secret.81 
D.  A LOOK AT THE STATE OF TRADE SECRET LAW AND THE POTENTIAL 
THREATS OF DISCLOSURE 
A generic manufacturer need not register its bioequivalency test as a trade 
secret, but in order to qualify for trade secret protection, a bioequivalency test 
must meet the legal definition of a “trade secret.”82  This part examines several 
common definitions of “trade secret,” which will be used in Part III to 
demonstrate how a bioequivalency test fits within the scope of protectability.  
This section also briefly introduces the ways in which a bioequivalency test 
protected by trade secret law can be disclosed, including through a FOIA 
request, FDA use, discovery requests, and the common law right of public 
access. 
Although trade secret law originally evolved under state common law, the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA),83 was created to make state trade secret law 
more homogenous and has been adopted by all but three states.84  The 
                                                                                                                   
 75 For more information on the requirements for a valid patent, see id. at 129–54.  See also 35 
U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112.  
 76 35 U.S.C. § 187. 
 77 Id. § 254. 
 78 See id. § 255. 
 79 Id. §§ 277–278. 
 80 Id. § 118. 
 81 Id. § 27. 
 82 MILLER & LOREN, supra note 4, at 27.  
 83 Unif. Trade Secrets Act (1979) (amended 1985). 
 84 MILLER & LOREN, supra note 4, at 28. 
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following discussion refers to the UTSA as adopted by New Jersey, a state 
home to a large percentage of the United States’ drug manufacturers.85 
The New Jersey UTSA outlines the definition of a ‘trade secret’ and the 
circumstances under which a trade secret can be misappropriated:  
“[T]rade secret” means information, held by one or more people, 
without regard to form, including a formula . . . method . . . 
technique . . . or process that: (1) derives independent economic 
value . . . from not being generally known to, and not being 
readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and is the 
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy.86 
The UTSA thus provides direction to generic drug manufacturers seeking to 
protect their bioequivalency testing methods via trade secret law. However, 
each manufacturer should look at the specific adoption of the UTSA in their 
state in order to fully understand the scope of the trade secret protection 
offered.87 
In addition to the UTSA, the FDA also promulgates rules and regulations 
regarding trade secrets, so is important for generic manufacturers to keep the 
FDA’s definition of “trade secret” in mind when submitting their ANDAs.88  
Because the FDA receives a great deal of information from generic drug 
manufacturers, disclosure of this information to the public is of high 
importance to a manufacturer seeking protection.  The FDA’s provisions 
regarding the protection of submitted information strikingly states that “[t]he 
[FDA] will make the fullest possible disclosure of records to the public, 
consistent with the rights of individuals to privacy, the property rights of 
persons in trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial 
information.”89  It continues: “Except where specifically exempt pursuant to the 
                                                                                                                   
 85 Pharmaceuticals, STATE OF NEW JERSEY BUSINESS PORTAL, http://www.nj.gov/njbusiness/in 
dustry/pharmaceutical/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).   
 86 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:15-2 (West 2012). 
 87 With the exception of Massachusetts and New York, each state has adopted some form of 
the UTSA.  While the laws are similar, it is helpful to refer to a state’s specific version of the 
UTSA as a measure of precaution.  For a full list of each state’s UTSA law, see Trade Secrets Laws: 
State Law, ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUITCLIFF, LLP, http://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-
watch/trad e-secrets-laws/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2014). 
 88 See 21 C.F.R. § 20.61 (2013).  
 89 Id. § 20.20(a). 
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provisions of this part, all FDA records shall be made available for public 
disclosure.”90   
Due to the FDA’s proclivity towards disclosure of information, the FDA’s 
definition of “trade secret” is essential for the protection of information.91  
Courts have grappled with how expansively to construe the definition,92 which 
reads: 
A trade secret may consist of any commercially valuable plan, 
formula, process, or device that is used for the making, preparing, 
compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can 
be said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial 
effort.  There must be a direct relationship between the trade 
secret and the productive process.93 
Because requests for information made under the FOIA are a common way 
in which information known by the FDA can be disclosed, generic 
manufacturers will likely want to know whether trade secrets that are submitted 
to the FDA as a part of an ANDA could be disclosed by a FOIA request.94  
The Freedom of Information Act first became effective in 1967, and controls 
the public disclosure of previously unreleased information from federal 
agencies.95  The primary purpose of the FOIA is to enable the public to access 
government records in order to gain a greater understanding of the 
government.96 FOIA disclosures include everything from substantive and 
procedural rules regarding disclosure of information,97 administrative case law 
reporting,98 and statements of policy and agency interpretations.99  Perhaps the 
most controversial part of FOIA is found in section 3:  
                                                                                                                   
 90 Id. § 20.20(b). 
 91 Id. § 20.61(a) (“The Food and Drug Administration will make the fullest possible disclosure 
of records to the public, consistent with the rights of persons in trade secrets and confidential 
commercial or financial information, and the need for the agency to promote frank internal policy 
deliberations and to pursue its regulatory activities without disruption.”). 
 92 See, e.g., Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 1280 
(D.C. Cir. 1983).  
 93 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(a). 
 94 Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1967) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552). 
 95 What is FOIA, FOIA.GOV, http://www.foia.gov/about.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2014). 
 96 Id.  
 97 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(A)–(E) (2012). 
 98 Id. § 552(a)(2)(A). 
 99 Id. § 552(a)(2)(B).  
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Except with respect to the records made available under 
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, and except as provided 
in subparagraph (E), each agency, upon any request for records 
which (i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in 
accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if 
any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records 
promptly available to any person.100 
The agency must also perform a reasonable search to find the information101 
and must provide the information in the format requested.102  Like many other 
federal agencies, the FDA has its own Freedom of Information A 
ct Office, called the Food and Drug Administration Division of Freedom of 
Information,103 wherein a person who is seeking information from the FDA 
must submit a request.104  
Although the FOIA attempts to make as much agency information available 
to the public as possible, there are some exceptions to what information a 
petitioner can receive.  For example, agencies may withhold information that is 
labeled confidential for the purposes of national security by an executive order,105 
information that is solely related to agency personnel rules,106 and information 
that is “exempted from disclosure by statute.”107  For information to be exempt 
by a specific statute, the statute must be clear as to what type of information may 
be withheld108 and must cite to the FOIA, in limited circumstances.109  Finally, 
exceptions to FOIA also exist for “trade secrets and commercial or financial 
information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential,”110 agency 
memorandums,111 and medical/personnel files.112  Although an exemption exists 
                                                                                                                   
 100 Id. § 552(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
 101 Id. § 552(a)(3)(C).  
 102 Id. § 552(a)(3)(B). 
 103 21 C.F.R. § 20.30(a) (2013). 
 104 Id. § 20.30(b). 
 105 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (2012).  
 106 Id. § 552(b)(2). 
 107 Id. § 552(b)(3) (to be exempted, the statute in question must “(i) require[ ] that the matters 
be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or (ii) 
establish[ ] particular criteria for withholding or refer[ ] to particular types of matters to be 
withheld; and (B) . . . specifically cite [ ] to this paragraph.” (id. § 552(b)(3)(A)(i)–(ii); (B))). 
 108 Id. § 552(b)(3)(A)(i)–(ii).  
 109 Id. § 552(b)(3)(B).  
 110 Id. § 552(b)(4). 
 111 Id. § 552(b)(5). 
 112 Id. § 552(b)(6). 
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for trade secrets, manufacturers will have concerns that their bioequivalency tests, 
which are worth millions of dollars, may not fit within the scope of protection. 
Hypothetically, if a generic manufacturer were to choose to protect its 
bioequivalency test via trade secret law, a competitor could try to access the test 
information by submitting a FOIA request for it.  Anyone who wishes to 
request information from the FDA must submit a FOIA request in writing to 
the FDA’s headquarters in Maryland.113  The writing must reasonably set forth 
the information being requested.114  So long as the writing reasonably details the 
information sought, “[e]very reasonable effort shall be made by the [FDA] to 
assist in the identification and location of the records sought.”115  The person 
submitting the request must also pay a fee, the amount of which is determined 
by the type of information requested.116  If the confidentiality of requested 
information is uncertain, the FDA will contact the entity who submitted the 
information and/or who will “be affected by its disclosure before determining” 
whether to disclose the information.117  
If the FDA rejects a request for information, “the decision constitutes final 
agency action that is subject to judicial review.”118  The person requesting the 
information will be notified of the FDA’s rejection and will then have five days 
after receipt of notification to file a suit in a United States District Court.119  
When trade secret information is requested and disclosure is denied,120 the FDA 
will inform the person who submitted the record that he or she must come and 
defend the record’s confidentiality in court.121  The statute reads, “If the 
affected person fails to intervene to defend the exempt status of the 
records . . . the [FDA] will take this failure into consideration in deciding 
whether that person has waived such exemption so as to require the [FDA] to 
promptly make the records available for public disclosure.”122  Thus, the FDA 
expects the person who submits information classified as a trade secret to 
defend this status if it is challenged.  While defending the trade secret status is 
not mandatory under the statute, it factors into the FDA’s decision of whether 
or not to disclose the information.123  
                                                                                                                   
 113 21 C.F.R. § 20.40(a) (2013). 
 114 Id. § 20.40(b). 
 115 Id. § 20.40(b)(2).  
 116 See id. § 20.45(a)(1)–(3). 
 117 Id. § 20.47. 
 118 Id. § 20.48. 
 119 Id.  
 120 Disclosures are denied under 21 C.F.R. § 20.61.  
 121 21 C.F.R. § 20.55. 
 122 Id.   
 123 Id.  
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Finally, even if a generic manufacturer meets the FDA’s definition of trade 
secret when submitting an ANDA and the FDA’s disclosure of the information 
via a FOIA request is limited, both the common law right of public access124 
and discovery requests125 pose additional threats for generic manufacturers who 
wish to protect their trade secrets.  The common law right of public access can 
arise during or after a lawsuit and poses a threat to generic manufacturers’ 
ability to protect bioequivalency tests, as courts strive to maintain open records 
of judicial proceedings.  The Second Circuit explains in Nycomed US, Inc. v. 
Glenmark Generics, Inc., that the right of public access allows open access to 
judicial documents to provide information to the public in hopes of making the 
courts appear more legitimate.126  For the purposes of this Note, the definition 
of “judicial documents” is particularly relevant because as the Second Circuit 
declared in Lugosh v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, judicial documents are presumed to 
be open to public access, as described in Part III.127 
In Stern v. Cosby, the Second Circuit additionally developed a three-part test 
to determine whether a judicial document is subject to the common law right of 
public disclosure.128  “First, the court must determine whether the documents 
are indeed judicial documents . . . Second, if the documents are judicial 
documents, the court must determine the weight of the presumption [of 
disclosure]. . . .  Third, once the weight of the presumption is determined, a 
court must balance competing considerations against it.”129  Altogether the right 
of public access threatens disclosure of trade secrets.  However, a generic 
manufacturer can successfully argue that bioequivalency tests disclosed in 
ANDAs should not be subject to the common law right of public access.130  
Likewise, discovery requests also pose a threat to generic manufacturers who 
could protect their bioequivalency tests as trade secrets.  The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure do not contain an absolute privilege for trade secrets that are 
requested during discovery,131 but Rules 26 and 45 can help generic 
                                                                                                                   
 124 See, e.g., Stern v. Cosby, 529 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
 125 See, e.g., Massey Coal Services, Inc. v. Victaulic Co. of Am., 249 F.R.D. 477 (S.D. W. Va. 
2008). 
 126 Nycomed US, Inc. v. Glenmark Generics, Inc., No. 08-CV-5023 (CBA), 2010. 
 127 435 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 
409 (1st Cir. 1987)) (“[R]elevant documents which are submitted to, and accepted by, a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the course of adjudicatory proceedings become documents to which the 
presumption of public access applies.”).  
 128 Stern v. Cosby, 529 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
 129 Id. (quoted in Nycomed US, Inc. v. Glenmark Generics, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20788 
(E.D.N.Y.) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 130 See infra notes 196–208.  
 131 See generally Paulsen v. Case Corp., 168 F.R.D. 285 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
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manufacturers to protect their bioequivalency test trade secrets from disclosure 
during litigation.  Rule 26 provides a scenario in which a party may receive a 
protective order from the court in order to guard against the disclosure of a 
trade secret132: “The motion must include a certification that the movant has in 
good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an 
effort to resolve the dispute without court action.”133  Then, the rule states, “the 
court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense” by 
several following methods.134  One of the following ways to protect a party 
includes: “requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research 
development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in 
a specific way.”135  Because any relevant evidence will lend a presumption of 
admissibility, the party seeking protection has the burden of proof that the 
information should not be disclosed.136  Thus, although there is no per se 
protection of trade secrets in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,137 generic 
manufacturers could use Rule 26 and case law relating to discovery and the 
common law right of public access to argue that their bioequivalency tests 
protected as trade secrets should not be disclosed. 
Like Rule 26, Rule 45 also helps ensure that trade secrets are not wrongfully 
disclosed during discovery by protecting trade secrets from subpoenas.  A 
subpoena is an order from a government agency, usually a court, which compels 
a witness to testify or produce evidence.138  In relevant part, Rule 45 states, “To 
protect a person subject to or affected by a subpoena, the court for the district 
where compliance is required may, on motion, quash or modify the subpoena if 
it requires: (i) disclosing a trade secret or other confidential research, 
development, or commercial information. . . .”139  Subsequent case law has 
stated that when a court is deciding whether to quash a subpoena which seeks 
information marked as a trade secret, “a court must evaluate all the 
circumstances and balance, inter alia, the requesting party’s need for the 
information and the potential prejudice imposed on the requested party.”140  
Furthermore, the factors to be balanced include “the relevance of the discovery 
                                                                                                                   
 132 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1). 
 133 Id.  
 134 Id.  
 135 Id. at 26(c)(1)(G). 
 136 In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70246, at *31 (S.D.N.Y.). 
 137 See Paulsen v. Case Corp., 168 F.R.D. 285, 289 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
 138 Merriam Webster, Subpoena, MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-webster. 
com/dictionary/subpoena (last visited Sept. 30, 2014).  
 139 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(B)(i).  
 140 Insulate America v. Masco Corp., 227 F.R.D. 427, 432 (W.D.N.C. 2005) (citations omitted).  
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sought, the requesting party’s need, and the potential hardship to the party 
subject to the subpoena.”141  
Altogether, the numerous rules that govern the FDA’s submission of 
information, FOIA requests, the FDA’s use, the common law right of public 
access, and discovery requests could each pose a threat to manufacturers who 
wish to protect their bioequivalency tests via trade secret law.  Nevertheless, 
there are various situations in which a competing drug manufacturer could 
attempt to access a bioequivalency test protected by trade secret law, as next 
explained in Part III.  These situations include disclosure requests from third 
parties,142 threats of disclosure or use by the FDA,143 and the threat of 
disclosure during litigation through the assertion of common law right of public 
access or a discovery request.144  A generic manufacturer seeking to protect its 
bioequivalency test via trade secret law should pay close attention to the way 
courts define the scope of trade secret and the various methods that 
competitors can use to seek disclosure of trade secret information.                                                                  
III.  ANALYSIS  
Given Momenta’s holding that the safe harbor provision of the Hatch-
Waxman Act encompasses a drug manufacturer’s use of another’s 
bioequivalency testing methods for pre-clinical research and manufacturing, 
patent law offers little to no protection for generic manufacturers who wish to 
protect their bioequivalency tests from appropriation by competitors.145  
Because FDA regulations of ANDAs are complex and require each 
manufacturer to make a specific showing of how it meets the requirements to 
legally manufacture a drug, as discussed above, the FDA requires generic drug 
manufacturers to disclose their bioequivalency testing methods to ensure that a 
drug in production is both safe and effective.146  Due to the extensive 
information required by the FDA, ANDAs are therefore expensive to produce.  
Moreover, since bioequivalency tests can be difficult, time consuming, and 
expensive to develop, generic manufacturers often use patent protection to 
                                                                                                                   
 141 Dorel Juvenile Grps., Inc. v. Summer Infant, Inc., C 06-91 S, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77906 
(D.R.I. Oct. 11, 2006) (quoting Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1024 
(Fed. Cir. 1986)).  
 142 See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 1280 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983).  
  143 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (involving a similar situation in the 
Environmental Protection Agency).  
 144 See Nycomed US, Inc. v. Glenmark Generics, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20788 (S.D.N.Y.). 
 145 Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Rader, J., dissenting).  
 146 See supra notes 17–25 and accompanying text. 
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make investment in bioequivalency testing methods worthwhile.  However, 
after the Momenta holding, adequate patent protection of bioequivalency tests 
has been lost, leaving generic manufacturers little incentive to invest in their 
development.  Nevertheless, trade secret law endures to protect generic drug 
manufacturers’ bioequivalency tests from appropriation by competitors.  This 
Note argues that trade secret is in fact the best and most natural method for 
protecting bioequivalency tests after Momenta, and therefore seeks to advise 
generic drug manufacturers of the potential hurdles to overcome in gaining 
such protection. 
This section first discusses the scope of the definition of trade secret in 
various contexts, keeping in mind that competitors who seek the information 
will try to attack the definitions of both the UTSA and the FDA.  Next, this 
section explores the different ways for generic manufacturers to overcome 
potential threats of misappropriation, in particular by jumping three different 
anticipated hurdles to trade secret protection.  These hurdles are: a FOIA 
request made by a third party, potential use and disclosure of protected 
information via FDA regulations, and disclosure during litigation via the 
common law right of public access and the discovery process.  Finally, this 
section argues how each of these potential threats to protecting bioequivalency 
tests can be avoided. 
A.  THE SCOPE OF THE DEFINITION OF “TRADE SECRET” 
Before seeking trade secret protection for a bioequivalency testing method, 
it is important to look at the exact definition of “trade secret” in order to 
understand exactly what can be protected.  As was explored above, there are 
different working definitions of what constitutes a trade secret, and each is 
important different contexts.147  Generic manufacturers seeking to protect their 
bioequivalency tests via trade secret law should this to make sure to distinguish 
these definitions from each other and understand when each definition applies.  
Two of the relevant definitions of trade secret are the UTSA definition148 and 
the FDA’s definition.149  
A bioequivalency testing method would be considered a ‘trade secret’ for the 
purposes of both the UTSA and the FDA’s definitions.  The UTSA has a broad 
definition of “trade secret,” including formulas, methods, techniques, or 
processes.150  Similarly the FDA, defines a trade secret as, “[A]ny commercial 
                                                                                                                   
 147 See supra notes 77–87 and accompanying text. 
 148 See supra note 92.  
 149 21 C.F.R. § 20.61 (2013).  See also supra note 93. 
 150 See supra note 92.  
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valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used for the making, preparing, 
compounding, or processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be 
the end product of either innovation or substantial effort.”151  A bioequivalency 
test would easily classify as a trade secret under either of these definitions as a 
formula is used for the purposes of demonstrating that a generic drug is the 
bioequivalent of, or the same as, the name brand.152  Since bioequivalency 
testing methods should meet either the UTSA or FDA definition of trade 
secret, generic manufacturers do retain an incentive for economic investment in 
their development, despite the inadequacy of patent protection to do the same 
after the Momenta court’s holding. 
B.  THE THREAT OF DISCLOSURE  
Once a generic manufacturer decides to protect bioequivalency test as a 
trade secret, there are three potential ways in which a generic drug 
manufacturer’s trade secret could be disclosed: first, through a FOIA request; 
second, through use by the FDA itself; and third, through an assertion of the 
common law right of public access during the discovery process of litigation. 
1.  Overcoming the Threat of Disclosure Via a FOIA Request.  The D.C. Circuit’s 
discussion of the scope of trade secret protection in the FOIA context in Public 
Citizen Health Research Group v. Food & Drug Administration demonstrates that this 
scope is broad enough to protect bioequivalency tests.153  In Public Citizen 
Health, the plaintiff consumer advocacy group sought information from the 
FDA regarding the safety and effectiveness of an intraocular lens that had been 
on the market for several years.154  The manufacturer of the intraocular lenses 
submitted clinical test results to the FDA, and the manufacturer objected to the 
disclosure of these results to the petitioner, who had made a FOIA request for 
them.155  The court was asked to determine whether the requested records were 
“immune from disclosure under Exemptions 3 and 4 of the FOIA.”156  As the 
court explained, “[t]hese exemptions allow the court to withhold, respectively, 
(1) records that are ‘specifically exempted from disclosure by statute’ if the 
relevant statute satisfies one of two limiting conditions and (2) ‘trade secrets and 
                                                                                                                   
 151 21 C.F.R. § 20.61.  
 152 See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(discussing the “sufficient information [needed] to establish that the generic drug has the same 
active ingredients as the reference drug”). 
 153 Public Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Food & Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  
 154 Id. at 1283.  
 155 Id.  
 156 Id. at 1282. 
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commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or 
confidential.”157  In affirming in part and reversing in part, the D.C. Circuit held 
that the district court “erred in its application of Exemption 3 and adopted an 
overly broad construction of the term ‘trade secrets’ in Exemption 4”; 
therefore, the court partially granted the petitioner’s request for the drug 
manufacturer’s clinical test results.158 
The court’s discussion of Exemption 4, and more specifically whether “the 
requested documents constitute ‘trade secrets’ [and are therefore] exempt from 
disclosure”159 illustrates that manufacturers can shield bioequivalency tests from 
third parties urging disclosure through a FOIA request by protecting them as 
trade secrets.  After evaluating several different definitions of “trade secrets” at 
common law, and finding that the Restatement of Torts’s expansive 
definition160 “would classify virtually all undisclosed health and safety testing 
data as trade secrets,”161 the court settled on a more restrictive definition to 
adopt in FOIA cases.162  “Defined in its narrower common law sense,” a trade 
secret is “a secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that 
is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade 
commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either innovation of 
substantial effort.”163   In arguing that this is the best definition of trade secret, 
the court stated that it “incorporates a direct relationship between the 
information at issue and the productive process.”164 
Although the court in Public Citizen Health chose the more restrictive 
definition of trade secret, believing that it “hews more closely to language and 
legislative intent of FOIA than does the Restatement approach,”165 this definition 
can still be used to protect bioequivalency testing methods.  A bioequivalency 
testing method should qualify as a trade secret because it is “a commercially 
                                                                                                                   
 157 Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3), (4). 
 158 Public Citizen Health, 704 F.2d at 1282.  
 159 Id. at 1286; see also 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4). 
 160 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (“A trade secret may consist of any formula, 
pattern, device, or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives 
him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.”).  The 
definition of ‘trade secret’ as specified in the Restatement has been adopted by other courts.  See, 
e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). 
 161 Public Citizen Health, 704 F.2d at 1286 (quoting Thomas McGarity & Sidney Shapiro, The 
Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 837, 861 (1980)). 
 162 Id. at 1286–87. 
 163 Id. at 1288.  
 164 Id.  
 165 Id. at 1289. 
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valuable . . . formula . . . that is used for the making of trade commodities” i.e., 
a prescription drug, that is the “product of either innovation or substantial 
effort.”166  There is no doubt that a bioequivalency test would be considered 
“commercially valuable”; the competing generic manufacturer in Momenta, for 
example, was able to make over $260 million per quarter after using the patent 
holder’s bioequivalency test.167  Furthermore, a bioequivalency test certainly 
qualifies as a formula, as it is used for the making of pharmaceutical drugs, 
which also constitute “trade commodities.”  There is also a direct relationship 
between the bioequivalency testing methods and the productive process of 
manufacturing drugs, unlike the information requested in Public Citizen Health.168  
Thus, even under the more restrictive definition of ‘trade secret’ as used by the 
D.C. Circuit and some other courts in determining the possibility of disclosure 
via a FOIA request, a generic manufacturer should be able to protect 
bioequivalency tests as trade secrets and will be immune from disclosure under 
Exemption 4 of FOIA.169  
2.  Overcoming Threats of Disclosure Via the FDA’s Use and Disclosure of Trade 
Secrets.  In addition to FOIA requests, competitors could potentially gain access 
to bioequivalency tests protected by trade secret law through the FDA’s own 
use and disclosure of the protected information.  While it is true that 
bioequivalency test trade secrets would have to be disclosed to the FDA in 
order to submit an ANDA, generic manufacturers should be assured that the 
FDA can only disclose protected information to third parties under limited 
circumstances.170 
The Supreme Court addressed the question of when an agency may use and 
disclose information that is freely submitted by a manufacturer seeking agency 
approval to produce a product in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,171 whose reasoning can 
be applied to bioequivalency tests to demonstrate that the scope of trade secret 
protection is broad enough to prevent the FDA from disclosing the 
information.  The issue in the case was whether a pesticide manufacturer who 
submitted an application for market approval of its pesticide to the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could claim trade secret protection 
                                                                                                                   
 166 Id. 
 167 Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
 168 See 704 F.2d at 1290 (“[W]e conclude that [the records at issue] are not protected under the 
first prong of Exception 4.  The relationship of the requested information to the productive 
process is tangential at best . . . .”).  
 169 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(4).  
 170 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).  
 171 Id. at 990.  
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for health and safety information submitted as part of the application.172  
Congress passed the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA), which gave the EPA the authority to regulate the sale of pesticides.173  
In order to market a pesticide in the United States, a manufacturer must gain 
EPA approval,174 which parallels the requirement that a generic manufacturer 
must have FDA approval in order to market a generic drug. 
Monsanto, a company that developed and manufactured pesticides, 
submitted an application to the EPA for approval to market a new chemical.175  
Throughout the application process, Monsanto took special care to protect 
health and safety data that they used to test the chemical.176  The company 
spent approximately $23.6 million in order to generate this information, and did 
not want the EPA to use it to test other chemicals.177  Under the FIFRA statute, 
however, the EPA was allowed to use information submitted for the 
registration of a pesticide to evaluate subsequent applications, and the statute 
also allowed the EPA to publicly disclose some of the submitted information.178  
The statute was silent with regard to the disclosure of health and safety 
information, which the manufacturer was seeking to protect.179  The stakes of 
the case were raised because like developing and marketing a generic drug,180 
manufacturing a pesticide requires expenditures of between five and fifteen 
million dollars annually over several years.181  When the EPA tried to use and 
disclose Monsanto’s health and safety information, the company sued, claiming 
that the EPA’s use of its health and safety data constituted a taking and was 
prohibited under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.182 
The Supreme Court asked whether Monsanto had a property interest in the 
health and safety data, and if it did, whether the EPA’s use of the data 
                                                                                                                   
 172 Id. at 998.  
 173 61 Stat. 163 (1947), codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2012). 
 174 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 991.  
 175 Id. at 997–98. 
 176 Id. at 998.  
 177 Id.  
 178 Id. at 990.  
 179 Id. at 991. 
 180 Although the cost of developing and manufacturing a generic drug is only about 15% of the 
price of developing and manufacturing a new, brand name drug (Facts about Generic Drugs, U.S. 
Food & Drug Admin., http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/buyingusingmedici 
nesafely/understandinggenericdrugs/ucm167991.html (last updated Sept. 19, 2012)), manufacturing 
a generic can still cost between $120–$150 million (ABC News, Bitter Medicine: Pills, Profits and the 
Public Health, ABC TELEVISION BROAD., May 29, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Transcripts File).  
 181 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 998.  
 182 Id. at 1001; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”).  
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constituted a taking.183  Because Monsanto asserted that the data was a trade 
secret, the Court chose the Restatement of Torts’ definition of ‘trade secret’ for 
the purposes of deciding the case.184  According to the Restatement, a trade 
secret is “any . . . compilation of information which is used in one’s business, 
and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors 
who do not know or use it.”185  The Court found that Monsanto did have a 
property right protectable by the Fifth Amendment in the data.186  However, 
the Court also ruled that, “[A]s long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions 
under which the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally related to 
a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary submission of data by an 
applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can hardly 
be called a taking.”187  In other words, because Monsanto was on notice during 
some of the relevant statutory period that the EPA could use the information to 
evaluate other chemicals and could subject it to public disclosure, the EPA’s use 
of the information could not constitute a taking for the purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment.  The Court further noted that some of the EPA’s disclosure of 
health and safety information constituted a taking,188 because Monsanto 
classified the submitted information as a trade secret, which, for a certain period 
before the statute was amended, was permitted.189 
Ruckelshaus offers a lesson to generic drug manufacturers about the limits of 
the protection offered by trade secret law for their bioequivalency tests.  So 
long as a bioequivalency test meets the appropriate requirements for a trade 
secret under the Restatement of Torts, a manufacturer has a property interest in 
the test.190  This is important because if the test constitutes property, then some 
immunity against disclosure would apply, and the FDA will not have freedom 
to disclose the information to whomever asks.  However, the holding of 
Ruckelshaus indicates that this exclusion right is not unlimited and that courts 
would likely be unsympathetic to a generic manufacturer who submitted 
information to the FDA knowing that the FDA was able to use and disclose 
certain information.191  Thus, it is important for generic manufacturers to take 
precautions demonstrating the value of a bioequivalency test and its utmost 
                                                                                                                   
 183 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1000.  
 184 Id. at 1001.  
 185 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b). 
 186 Id. at 1003–04.  
 187 Id. at 1007.  
 188 Id. at 1010.  
 189 Id. at 1011.  
 190 Id. at 1003–04. 
 191 See id. at 1007.  
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importance to the process of manufacturing a generic drug, as did the petitioner 
in Ruckelshaus with the health and safety information pertaining to its pesticide. 
Section 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations is particularly instructive as to 
the FDA’s rights to information submitted to it by generic drug 
manufacturers.192  The FDA’s policy is to make the fullest disclosure of 
information possible, except when the information falls into a protected 
category, one of which is a trade secret.193  For this reason, it is important that 
drug manufacturers classify bioequivalency tests as trade secrets from the time 
of their first application for FDA approval.  Furthermore, the court will often 
ascertain the actual value of submitted information by looking at the submitter’s 
own efforts to protect it,194 so generic manufacturers should take measures to 
protect the submitted information.  For example, in Ruckelshaus, the Court 
noted, “Monsanto has instituted stringent security measures to ensure the 
secrecy of the data.”195  Thus, if generic manufacturers take steps to protect 
their bioequivalency tests from disclosure before the information is submitted 
to the FDA, this evidence of the tests’ value would cut in favor of the 
manufacturer were the FDA to consider disclosure.  While the Ruckelshaus 
Court noted that “the Trade Secrets Act is not a guarantee of confidentiality to 
submitters of data,”196 classifying information as a trade secret before submitting 
the information to the FDA can offer the submitter greater protection.  
3.  Overcoming Potential Litigation-Related Threats of Disclosure Right of Public 
Access.  In addition to the threats of disclosure posed by FOIA requests and 
FDA use of the information, litigation proceedings, and specifically discovery 
requests, pose a third potential threat of disclosure.  For example, if a generic 
manufacturer were to be sued by a competitor or third party, the generic 
manufacturer will be concerned that a bioequivalency trade secret could be 
subject to disclosure through a discovery request.  While the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure contain specific provisions to protect litigating parties from the 
disclosure of trade secrets during the discovery process,197 generic 
manufacturers will want to take special precautions in order to receive full 
protection for their bioequivalency tests.  Case law can additionally protect a 
                                                                                                                   
 192 See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.  
 193 See supra notes 85–104 and accompanying text. 
 194 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002. 
 195 Id. at 998. 
 196 Id. at 1008. 
 197 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1)(G); id. § 45(d)(3)(B). 
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generic manufacturer’s bioequivalency tests from litigation-related threats of 
disclosure.198   
The threat of trade secret disclosure posed by the discovery process can be 
very serious because of the common law right of public access.199  As the court 
notes in Nycomed, “The courts have long recognized a common law right of 
public access to judicial documents.”200  The primary theory behind the doctrine 
of the right of public access is related to the desire for the general public to 
perceive the court as an independent and legitimate body.201  The Second 
Circuit has noted, “The political branches of government claim legitimacy by 
election, judges by reason.  Any step that withdraws an element of the judicial 
process from public view makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat and 
requires rigorous justification.”202  Thus, courts are strict about maintaining 
public access to judicial documents in order to maintain legitimacy and provide 
information for the general public.  However, the court’s desire conflicts with a 
generic drug manufacturer’s interest in keeping information about 
bioequivalency tests hidden. 
If a trade secret cannot withstand the common law right of public access, 
trade secret protection is of little use to generic manufacturers who face a 
discovery request by an opposing party for documents containing information 
related to bioequivalency testing methods.  Although the common law right of 
public access can make the process of protection tricky for generic 
manufacturers, generic manufacturers can use the Second Circuit’s three part 
test to determine whether a judicial document should be susceptible to the 
common law right of public access203 in order to argue against disclosure. 
The Second Circuit has stated that when judicial documents are requested, 
the presumption is that they are susceptible to public access.204  Courts do err 
on the side of disclosure, but the common law right of public access is not 
absolute.205  The Second Circuit’s test to determine whether a judicial document 
is subject to the common law right of public access, as mentioned previously, 
involves three steps206: “First, the court must determine whether the documents 
are indeed judicial documents . . . Second, if the documents are judicial 
                                                                                                                   
 198 See, e.g., Nycomed US, Inc. v. Glenmark Generics, Inc., No. 08-CV-5023(CBA), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 20788 (E.D.N.Y.). 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. at *7 (quoting Stern v. Cosby, 529 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).  
 201 Id.  
 202 Id. (quoting United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2008)).  
 203 See supra notes 128–29.  
 204 See United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1047–49 (2d Cir. 1995).  
 205 See Nixon v. Warner Commc’s, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978). 
 206 Stern v. Cosby, 529 F. Supp. 2d 417, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  See also supra notes 128–29. 
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documents, the court must determine the weight of the presumption [of 
disclosure]. . . .  Third, once the weight of the presumption is determined, a 
court must balance competing considerations against it.”207   
It is likely that, were the situation to arise, a generic manufacturer could 
successfully argue that a bioequivalency test protected as a trade secret should 
not be susceptible to the common law right of public access under the Second 
Circuit’s analysis.208  Looking at the first factor—“whether the documents were 
judicial documents to which the public had a right of access”209—a 
manufacturer could likely end the inquiry here.  The definition of “judicial 
documents,” as discussed in Part II.C,210 is “relevant documents which are 
submitted to, and accepted by, a court of competent jurisdiction in the course 
of adjudicatory proceedings, [and] become documents to which the 
presumption of public access applies.”211  Thus, the only way that the definition 
would apply is if the documents with the relevant trade secret information were 
requested by or submitted to a court, which is not likely to be necessary unless 
the lawsuit concerns the bioequivalency testing method itself. 
In addition, even if a court does request documents containing trade secrets, 
generic manufacturers could argue against disclosure based on the theory 
behind the common law right itself.  For example, if the goal of this doctrine of 
the right to public access is to portray the court as a legitimate and independent 
body that can be trusted and respected, then the disclosure of a document upon 
which a manufacturer has built its business could be harmful to the court’s 
reputation.  Inventors, manufacturers, and producers of lucrative goods would 
hesitate to turn to the courts for a remedy if the court would simply disclose 
their trade secrets to the first person who asks.  
Turning to the second factor, “the weight of the presumption of 
disclosure,”212 a generic manufacturer would again have a strong argument 
against disclosure.  As the court notes, “[T]he weight of the presumption 
depends on the ‘role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial 
power and the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the 
                                                                                                                   
 207 Stern, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 420 (quoted in Nycomed US, Inc. v. Glenmark Generics, Inc., 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20788 (E.D.N.Y.)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 208 See supra notes 128–29.  
 209 See supra notes 128–29. 
 210 See supra note 127. 
 211 Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting FTC v. 
Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987)). 
 212 Stern, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 420.  
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federal courts.’ ”213  In other words, due to the high value of a bioequivalency 
test being kept a secret from competing manufacturers, the presumption of 
disclosure by the court would not be high and would favor the position of a 
generic manufacturer.  The court further states the inquiry is often based largely 
on whether the information sought to be disclosed is germane to the litigation, 
especially if the information is used for a motion to dismiss.214  Thus, for the 
purposes of a generic manufacturer protecting a bioequivalency test, unless the 
test itself was of central importance to the litigation, the presumption would 
weigh in favor of nondisclosure.  Furthermore, keeping in mind the purpose of 
the doctrine, it makes sense that the presumption is stronger when the 
information is related to a motion to dismiss, because if the court dismisses a 
case based on a motion, it needs to show good cause for the dismissal. 
Finally, when looking at the third factor—competing considerations against 
the presumption215—it is likely that the generic manufacturer would be able to 
win the battle over disclosure at this step, if they could not do so via steps one 
or two.  As mentioned above, if courts will disclose lucrative, competition-
driving methods and formulas to the public during litigation, generic 
manufacturers seeking protection will not seek judicial remedies.  Furthermore, 
a manufacturer’s active and vigorous defense of a trade secret is itself evidence 
of its value.  If public disclosure via the common law right of public access 
causes the generic manufacturer to lose its competitive advantage, as well as the 
millions of dollars it invested in development of the secret,216 the presumption 
would favor disclosure.  As demonstrated in Momenta, bioequivalency tests offer 
a competitive advantage to generic companies who develop them.217  Because 
so much of the generic manufacturer’s competitive advantage is stored in the 
bioequivalency test, the court would be reticent to subject this precious and 
valuable information to judicial disclosure. 
For example, in Nycomed, the defendant sought to have the plaintiff’s brief 
containing motions to amend the pleadings exempted from the common law 
right of public access, as the brief allegedly contained information that the 
defendant considered confidential.218  Defendant Glenmark argued that because 
                                                                                                                   
 213 Nycomed US, Inc. v. Glenmark Generics, Inc., No. 08-CV-5023(CBA), 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20788, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d 
Cir. 1995)) (internal citations omitted). 
 214 Id.  
 215 Id. at *8. 
 216 See, e.g., Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2012).  
 217 Id.  
 218 Nycomed, 2010 U.S. District LEXIS 20788, at *12. 
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two paragraphs of the plaintiff’s motion contained confidential information 
related to Glenmark’s ANDA, this information was exempt from public 
disclosure.219  The court, however, disagreed.  This situation is easily 
distinguishable from the hypothetical situation in which a third party is invoking 
the doctrine of public access against a generic manufacturer with the hope of 
gaining access to a bioequivalency test protected via trade secret law, because 
information protected as trade secret would not be found in an opposing party’s 
brief to start with, if it was actually a secret.  In Nycomed, the defendant sought 
to protect information contained in the plaintiff’s brief; surely an opposing 
party’s motion to amend the pleadings should not contain information related 
to a vigorously protected trade secret in the first place, if the alleged trade secret 
were really a secret.  After reviewing the FDA’s relevant provisions regarding 
the disclosure of pending ANDA’s, the court notes, “Certainly, any information 
that is already public, or is independently made public, cannot be deemed 
confidential.”220  The court also noted that the FDA’s regulations guarded only 
against disclosure by the FDA and not the common law right of public 
access.221  Thus, so long as the generic manufacturer actually treats the 
bioequivalency test information allegedly within the scope of the common law 
right of public access as a legitimate secret, the presumption against disclosure 
during litigation should cut in favor of the generic manufacturer. 
In addition to the potential for disclosure due to a competitors assertion of 
the common law doctrine of public access during litigation, the discovery rules 
could also pose a legitimate threat to generic manufacturers who seek to protect 
their bioequivalency tests.  As several cases have noted, there is no absolute 
privilege which protects trade secrets from disclosure under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.222  However, many cases have noted that courts should try 
to avoid unnecessary disclosure of trade secrets during discovery.223  Rules 26 
and 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure both discuss ‘trade secrets,’224 
and often work together to protect parties from disclosure.225 
In Massey Coal Services, Inc., for example, the court explained the 
circumstances under which a court can issue a protective order pursuant to Rule 
                                                                                                                   
 219 Id. at *15. 
 220 Id. at *16. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Paulsen v. Case Corp., 168 F.R.D. 285, 289 (C.D. Cal. 1996).  
 223 Hamilton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 204 F.R.D. 420, 422 (S.D. Ind. 2001).  
 224 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 45; see also text accompanying notes 131–36 for a review of rules 26 
and 45. 
 225 See generally In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-MO-1789(JCF), 2009 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 70246, at *30 (S.D.N.Y.).  
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26(c)(1)(G) to prevent a party from having to disclose a trade secret during the 
discovery stage of litigation.226  The plaintiff, Massey Coal, sued defendant, 
Victaulic, for various counts of breach of contract and misrepresentation.227  
The defendants manufactured and installed piping that the plaintiff used in its 
coalmines; when the pipes failed, the defendants admitted there was a problem 
but would not provide further information.228  Before the hearing, the judge 
issued a protective order for “documents or other materials . . . subject to 
disclosure . . . [that are] confidential and should not be disclosed other than in 
connection with this action.”229  The defendant disclosed to the plaintiffs 
several documents marked ‘CONFIDENTIAL’ per the protective order, a few 
of which demonstrated that the defendants knew that a chemical used to make 
the pipes was potentially causing the pipes to fail.  Because the pipes were used 
to carry drinking water throughout the county, the plaintiffs made a motion to 
disclose the information to the Public Service Authority.230  The defendant 
objected, invoking protection from Rule 26(c)(1)(G)231 and arguing that the 
documents contained commercially valuable information.232  For the purposes 
of analysis, the court noted that Rule 26(c)(1) “treats equally a trade secret or 
other confidential commercial information.”  
Ultimately, the trial judge held that the documents were not protectable via 
Rule 26(c)(1),233 but the reasoning of the court is helpful in understanding the 
scope of the protection offered under 26(c)(1).  In order to get a protective 
order for discovered documents under 26(c)(1), the party possessing the 
documents must show “good cause” for protection, including, most relevantly, 
“undue burden or expense.”234  Essentially, the defendants in this case argued 
that “severe economic damage” would result from disclosure.235  However, the 
court noted, “Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific 
examples . . . do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test.  Moreover, the harm must be 
significant, not a mere trifle.”236  Additionally, the court stated that the 
                                                                                                                   
 226 Massey Coal Servs., Inc. v. Victaulic Co. of Am., 249 F.R.D. 477 (S.D.W. Va. 2008). 
 227 Id. at 478.  
 228 Id.  
 229 Id. at 479.  
 230 Id.  
 231 Id. at 482 (internal quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted). 
 232 Id.  
 233 Id. at 484. 
 234 Id. at 480; Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1987) (addressing the 
“standard for determining whether [d]efendants have shown good cause for a protective order” 
(citations omitted))).  See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1); supra text accompanying note 134. 
 235 Massey Coal Servs., Inc., 249 F.R.D. 477.  
 236 Id. at 481 (citation omitted).  
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defendants had made no showing that they had undertaken efforts to keep the 
documents a secret,237 that the defendants had not objected to disclosure of the 
documents to the plaintiffs, that the documents were contained in the court’s 
public record, and that the defendants did not file a motion to seal the 
documents.238  In light of these facts, the court reasoned that the documents 
were not commercially valuable and were not protectable.239  The trial judge 
further stated that even if the disclosure of the documents to the state public 
health authorities would cause embarrassment to the defendants, the 
embarrassment was not a concern of the court and would not protect the 
documents from disclosure.240  
In light of the Massey court’s holding and reasoning, if a generic 
manufacturer protecting a bioequivalency test via trade secret law wishes to 
prevent disclosure via Rule 26(c)(1), it must show “good cause” for a protective 
order by demonstrating “undue burden or expense.”241  The manufacturer 
should provide the court with “specific examples or articulated reasoning”242 
that disclosure of the trade secret would cause substantial economic harm to the 
manufacturer.  Further, the manufacturer should show that this harm will be 
significant, and “not a mere trifle.”243  Generic manufacturers should also 
consider factors commonly used to measure secrecy, found in the Restatement 
of Torts.  Such factors can include: 
[T]he extent to which the information is known by employees 
and others involved in the business . . . the extent of measures 
taken by the business to guard the secrecy of the 
information . . . the value of the information to the business and 
to its competitors . . . and the amount of effort or money 
expended in developing the information.244 
                                                                                                                   
 237 Id. at 483.  
 238 Id. at 484.  
 239 Id. at 482–83.  
 240 Id. at 484.  
 241 See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1987); see also FED. R. CIV. 
P. 26(c)(1).  
 242 Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1121.  
 243 Id.  
 244 Massey Coal Servs., Inc., 249 F.R.D. at 482.  
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Again, since bioequivalency tests take substantial time, effort, and funding to 
create, they are critical to a generic manufacturer’s market competitiveness.245  
Therefore, the manufacturer should take great care in maintaining their secrecy, 
for example, by limiting the number of employees who have the formulas, 
making employees sign confidentiality agreements and covenants not to 
compete, and maintaining a financially reasonable amount of computer system 
security.  If a generic manufacturer is sued, it should be fairly simple to 
demonstrate to the court that documents containing the specific bioequivalency 
formula should either not be disclosed because they are not germane to the 
lawsuit, or that they should be privileged and confidential due to their 
economically valuable nature.  
In addition, Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,246 which 
governs subpoenas, could also benefit a generic manufacturer seeking to protect 
a bioequivalency test through trade secret law during litigation.  A generic 
manufacturer’s bioequialency test trade secret will lose its value if disclosed; 
given the test’s high value, generic manufacturers will want to be aware of the 
risk of being subpoenaed so that they can demonstrate, if necessary, why a 
bioequivalency test trade secret should not be disclosed.  When determining 
whether or not to quash a subpoena that could potentially pose a threat of 
disclosure to a generic manufacturer’s bioequivalency test trade secret, the court 
will balance the burden of disclosure with the potential need/use of the 
information.247 
Although there is also no per se protection for trade secrets under Rule 45, 
it is likely that a generic manufacturer would be able to withstand disclosure of a 
bioequivalency test in the event of a subpoena.  For example, In re Fosamax 
demonstrates that drug manufacturers can make a variety of creative arguments 
to successfully quash a subpoena that would result in disclosure.  A group of 
plaintiffs sued defendant drug company, Merck & Co., alleging that a drug they 
manufactured, Fosamax, caused adverse side effects.248  The plaintiffs issued a 
subpoena to Dr. Bruce Psaty from the National Academy of Sciences to testify 
about a drug safety report that he conducted under the direction of the FDA.249  
                                                                                                                   
 245 See Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99121 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 
2013). 
 246 FED. R. CIV. P. 45.  
 247 See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text.  
 248 In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-MO-1789(JFK)(JLF), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
70246, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2009). 
 249 Id. at *28. 
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Dr. Psaty moved to quash the subpoena under Rule 45(d)(3)(B),250 alleging that 
he never studied the drug in question;251 furthermore, the defendant urged that 
even if Dr. Psaty testified, it was unclear whether he would be required to 
disclose confidential information or trade secrets.252  In making its decision, the 
court tried to balance the burden between necessity of the testimony and the 
undue burden on the defendant to produce the information, ultimately 
quashing the subpoena.253  In considering whether there is an undue burden on 
the defendant, the court assesses the personal hardship to the party protecting 
the information and the wider social consequences of disclosing the 
information.254  Here, the court noted that if Dr. Psaty were required to testify, 
“the resulting social impact would be far more serious.  Compelling testimony 
from a third party researcher risks chilling participation in beneficial public 
research.”255  Thus, the court recognized the value of trade secrets, suggesting 
other courts will also protect them from disclosure during the discovery process 
by quashing a subpoena that would reveal them. 
When comparing this case with the potential disclosure of a generic 
manufacturer’s bioequivalency test, generic manufacturers who receive 
subpoenas would likely not be required to disclose trade secrets if called to 
testify.  Even if the testimony sought were important to the case, the balancing 
of the burden between necessity of the testimony and the undue burden placed 
on the defendant would likely weigh in favor of quashing the subpoena. The 
personal hardship to the generic manufacturer would be catastrophic, resulting 
in the loss of millions of dollars in profits or the loss of commercial market 
advantage.256  In addition, the consideration of wider social impact would weigh 
in favor of suppressing the subpoena, because requiring generic drug 
manufacturers to disclose trade secrets could have a chilling effect on beneficial 
scientific research.   
Generic manufacturers provide a valuable service to consumers by lowering 
the cost of drugs.  However, because the Federal Circuit’s expansive reading of 
                                                                                                                   
 250 Id. at *27.  See also FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(B)(i)–(ii) (“To protect a person subject to or 
affected by a subpoena, the court for the district where compliance is required may, on motion, 
quash or modify the subpoena if it requires: (i) disclosing a trade secret or other confidential 
research, development, or commercial information; or (ii) disclosing an unretained expert’s 
opinion or information that does not describe specific occurrences in dispute and results from the 
expert’s study that was not requested by a party.”). 
 251 In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70246, at *28.  
 252 Id. at *30.  
 253 Id. at *33–34.  
 254 Id. at *34.  
 255 Id. at *35.  
 256 See, e.g., Momenta Pharms., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
34
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol22/iss1/8
2014] TRADE SECRET RISING  243 
 
 
the safe harbor provision in Momenta v. Amphastar gives generic manufacturers 
little protection for their bioequivalency tests through patent law,257 the 
incentive to produce generic drugs will likely decrease if another method of 
protection is not found.  Although trade secret law does not provide per se 
protection from disclosure,258 generic manufacturers could still find adequate 
protection through trade secret law if they overcome the obstacles previously 
mentioned in the context of FOIA requests, FDA use of the information, and 
litigation.  
Although FOIA encourages the broad disclosure of government-held 
information, a generic manufacturer can demonstrate to the FDA’s FOIA 
office that bioequivalency test trade secrets are immune from disclosure.  The 
generic manufacturer can point to the definition of trade secret adopted in 
Public Citizen Health to argue that a bioequivalency text qualifies as a trade secret, 
exempting it from disclosure.  Generic manufacturers can also overcome the 
threat of disclosure posed by the FDA’s potential use or disclosure of the 
information, because the FDA is only allowed to disclose protected information 
submitted to it by a third party under limited circumstances.  Because generic 
manufacturers have a property interest in their bioequivalency test trade secrets, 
the FDA has a limited amount of power to disclose this information; so long as 
a generic manufacturer treats the bioequivalency test as a trade secret, the threat 
of disclosure by the FDA is manageable.  Finally, litigation-related threats of 
disclosure, specifically the common law right of public access and discovery 
requests made by parties to a litigation, can also be overcome by generic 
manufacturers.  The test developed by the Second Circuit in Stern v. Cosby can 
be used to show that the presumption in favor of disclosure present in the 
common law right of public access can be avoided by generic manufacturers 
protecting bioequivalency tests as trade secrets.  Furthermore, generic 
manufacturers could also protect their bioequivalency test trade secrets from 
disclosure via discovery requests through the protection offered by Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 45.  This Note has therefore demonstrated that 
generic manufacturers could successfully protect their bioequivalency research 
and development investments from use by competitors through the use of trade 
secret law. 
                                                                                                                   
 257 Id. at 1361. 
 258 United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 42 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that 
“trade secrets and other confidential commercial information enjoy no privilege from disclosure 
although courts may choose to protect such information”).   
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
Altogether, this Note has explored the impact and the consequences of the 
recent holding in Momenta and one potential solution to the problems created by 
the Federal Circuit.259  The Momenta majority held that a generic manufacturer 
who uses the patented bioequivalency test of a competitor is protected from 
liability by way of the safe harbor provision of the Hatch Waxman Act.260  As 
Chief Judge Rader points out in his dissent, the majority’s holding effectively 
renders all patents on bioequivalency testing methods worthless,261 an effect 
confirmed by later proceedings.262  In light of the Momenta holding, generic 
manufacturers are now in need of a way to protect their bioequivalency testing 
methods from use by their competitors.   This Note has demonstrated that 
trade secret law can provide a viable alternative to patent protection for generic 
manufacturers, at least in the absence of any action by Congress to address the 
Federal Circuit’s expansive reading of the safe harbor provision in Momenta v. 
Amphastar. 
Generic manufacturers can protect their bioequivalency tests through trade 
secret law by overcoming obstacles in three potentially threatening contexts.  
Generic manufacturers can overcome the threat of disclosure from a FOIA 
request by arguing that bioequivalency tests fit within the scope of the 
definition of “trade secret” and constitute commercially valuable information.  
Second, generic manufacturers can withstand the threat of disclosure through 
the FDA’s own use of the information by again arguing that a bioequivalency 
test constitutes a trade secret, under the specific FDA definition and by 
showing positive steps taken to treat the information as a secret, meeting the 
Second Circuit’s test.  Third, generic manufacturers can address the threat 
arising from the common law right of public access by arguing that the purpose 
of the right is for the public to view the court as a legitimate institution, and 
that this purpose would be defeated if the court disclosed a manufacturer’s 
extremely valuable information to competitors.   Finally, generic manufacturers 
can use trade secret law to protect bioequivalency tests despite the threat of 
disclosure from litigation by invoking Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(c) 
against discovery requests for documents and Rule 45 against subpoenas. 
Ideally, Congress will recognize the Federal Circuit’s unfortunate holding in 
Momenta with corrective legislation to restore the power of patent protection to 
                                                                                                                   
 259 Momenta Pharm., Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 260 Id. at 1361.  
 261 Id. at 1362 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 262  See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99121 (S.D.N.Y.). 
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generic manufacturers.  However, in the meantime, or indefinitely into the 
future if necessary, trade secret law can provide an alternative to patent 
protection for generic manufacturers who desire to protect their bioequivalency 
tests from the hungry eyes of their competitors.  
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